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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 40-2-53
TITLE:             Poland's Communist Party: Its History, Character and Composition
BY:                
DATE:              1959-3-11
COUNTRY:           Poland
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  Background Research

--- Begin ---

"E" DISTRIBUTION	400 11 MARCH 1952 

RFE NEWS & INFORMATION SERVICE - EVALUATION & RESEARCH SECTION

Background Research

POLAND'S COMMUNIST PARTY: 
ITS HISTORY, CHARACTER 
AND COMPOSITION

Polish Evaluation and
Research Units

Table of Contents

I	page

The Communist Party of Poland and its Forbears	1

II

The New Communist Party: the PPR (1942-1948)	12

III

The Bierut Era	18 

IV 

Wladyslaw Gomulka's Return to Power	21

Appendices[*]

I	The PZPR before the Third Congress	34
II	The Numerical Strength of the PZPR	36
III	Social Composition of the PZPR (in absolute figures)	37
IV	Social Composition of the PZPR (in percentages)	35
V	Social Composition of the PZPR (at 1 Sept 1958)	39
VI	Age of PZPR Members (in percentages)	40
VII	Number of Basic Party Organizations in PZPR	41
VIII	Numerical Strength of Polish Socialist Party (PPS)	42
IX	Social Composition of PPS (in percentages)	43
X	Numerical Strength of Polish Workers' Party (PPR)	44 
XI	Social Composition of PPR	45
XII	Numerical Strength of Communist Party of Poland (KPP)	46 
XIII	Social Composition of KPP in 1933	47
XIV	National Composition of KPP in 1933	48
XV	The Leaders of the Polish Communists and their Fate	49
XVI	Membership of the Politburo (1945-1959)	50 
XVII	Membership of the Party Secretariat (1348-1959)	52 
XVIII	Membership of the PZPR Central Committee (1948-1959)	54
XIX	Membership of the Audit Commission of the Party	62
XX	Membership of the Central Party Control Commission	63

* Appendices 1 to XIV were prepared by T.Zawadzki of the Polish Desk, RFE Munich.

POLAND'S COMMUNIST PARTY: ITS HISTORY, CHARACTER AND COMPOSITION

I

The Communist Party of Poland and its Forbears

The Origin of the CP of Poland

In order better to understand the history of the Polish
Communist Party and the reasons for its liquidation in 1938 as
well as the ideological chaos which pestered and decimated the
Party during the 20 years of its existence (1918-1938), it is
necessary to know these groups and factions which merged on 16
December 1916 into what was first known as Communist Workers' Party
of Poland (KPRP), and what was renamed in March 1925, during the
2nd Party Congress, the Communist Party of Poland (KPP). For the
sake of clarity the abbreviation KPP will be used here to mean
the Communist Party of Poland that is to say that Party which
existed since 16 December 1918 until 1938.

It should be kept In mind that a Polish Communist Party
was re-created, under the name of Polish Workers' Party (PPR) in
January 1942, under the German occupation, and was renamed PZPE
(Polish United Workers Party) in December 1948.

It follows that the Polish Communist Party has had, so
far, four names:

1918-1925 KPEP - Komunistycsna Partia Rcbotnicaa Folski;
1925-1938 KPP - Komunistyczna Partia Polski;
1942-1948 PPR - Polska Partia Robotnicza;
1948-PZPR - Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza.

Coming back to the KPP, it should be said that it
originated from a merger of two parties : Social Democracy of the Kingdom
of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPIL) and Polish Socialist Party-left
(PPS-Lewica). The Union became a fact during the so-called "Merger
Congress" on 16 December 1918.

It is interesting to note how each of the two component
Parts of the KPP had its origin, the in a merger (SDKPiL), the
other in a split (PPS-Iewica). 

The SDKPiL had its origin in two worker parties:

[page 2]

1) Union of Polish Workers (Zwiasek Robotnikow Polskich),
1889-1892, founded by Julian Marchlewski (died 1926) and Adolf
Warski (real name Warszawski, liquidated by the MKVD in 19370.)

2) Union of Lithuanian Workers, founded in 1892 in Vilna as a
branch of the Union of Polish Workers, with Feliks Dzierzynski
as its leader.

In 1893 the Union of Polish Workers together with some
wrecks of the Second Internationale formed a party called the
Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland, which in 1897 merged
with the Union of Lithuanian Workers under a long and rather
queer hut common name of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of
Poland and Lithuania.

To the leading group of this new party the following
people belonged:

Rosa Luxemburg (murdered in Berlin in 1919).
Leon-Jogiches (cover name "Tyszka".)
Feliks Dzierzynski.
Julian Marchlewski.
Adolf Warski.
Karol Radek.

The second component part of the KPP was the Polish
Socialist Party-Left, a splinter group of the Polish Socialist
Party founded under the name of "Polska Partia Socjalistyczna"
(PPS) in Paris in 1892. In 1907 the PPS split into two factions:

1) Revolutionary Faction (Frakcja Rewolucyjna - "fracy")
with Josef Pilsudski as its leader, and 

2) Polish Socialist Party-Left (PPS-Lewica).

The leading group of the PPS-Lewica consisted of the
following people:

Jerzy Sochacki-Czeszejko
Wera Kostrzewa (real name Maria Koszutska)
Walecki - real name Maks Horwits
Feliks Kon
Pawel Lapinski
Stefan Rajewski
inz. Marian Ciszewski
Zaks - (oover name Stanislaw Nerski, "Nerwowy")
Kazimiers Cichowski
Dr. Slawa Grosserowa
Waclaw Wroblewski (cover name "Krzysztof".)

[page 3]

All these people, with the exception of Feliks Kon, who
died a natural death, in the autumn of 1941, were later on
liquidated by the NKVD.

In the years 1919-192.0. large splinter groups of Jewish
Socialist organizations joined the KPP. People came fromt:

"Bund"
"Poaley Syon" (with Henrychowski, real name Saul-Amsterdam
leading the group,)
"Ferajnigte" (United).

Part of the Socialist Byelorussian Party and part of the
Ukrainian Social Democratic Party Joined as well. In 1920 the
leftist opposition of the Polish Socialist Party (not to be
confused with the PPS-Lewica) joined the KPP.

Apart from Socialist parties, other political
organizations supplied the KPP with their rebel members in the course of
the years. These newcomers recruited themselves from such peasant
organizations as:

"Wyzwolenie" (Liberation),
Independent Peasant Party (NPCh),
Radical Peasant Party (Radykalne Stronnictwo Chlopskie,
also known as Party of Rev. Okon.)

People came also from rightist groups, as for instance
from the National Workers' Party (NPR), and from Pilsudski's
Non--Party Bloc of Cooperation with the Government (BBWR), Senator
Boguszewski), as well as from various national minority
organisations.

The KPP - An Illegal Organization

The Polish Communist Party enjoyed legality for a short
period only. The First Congress of the Party, which took place in
December 1918, passed a number of resolutions which could not
please a newly reborn, independent state like Poland. The state
authorities declared the KPP to be illegal sometime in 1919. In
any case, in 1920 and later on during the whole period of Poland's
independence the KPP acted as an illegal, clandestine organization.
It came out as an organization once only, during Pilsudski's coup
d'etat in May 1926 when they sent him a handful of youngsters to
support him in his fight for power. This small group of Communist

[page 4]

youth was not admitted to take part in street fighting, and when
the coup was over the youngsters were sent back to their homes.
Polish Communists had some hope a that Pilsudski would grant them
legality and an amnesty to those who were in prisons. These hopes
did not materialize, a circumstance which became one of the reasons
for the negative attitude to Pilsudski after his a victorious coup
d'etat.

Between Germany and Russia

The policy of the KPP was determined by two factors:
raison d'etat of the Soviet Union and the problem of the so-called
"German revolution". As is generally known, the Bolsheviks regarded
Germany as a central point of the revolution in the West and shared
the view that only a German revolution would provoke a general
European explosion. This, of course, would only be brought about
with Soviet assistance.

It is obvious that Polish Communists had to mould their
policy according to the momentary exigencies of the much expected
German revolution. For instance, in order to strengthen the position
of German Communists their Polish comrades had to condemn the
Versailles Peace Treaty (which granted Poland independence,) and
were ready to give up to Germany Danzig, Upper Silesia and
Pomerania. Between the hammer of would-be German revolution and the sickle
of Soviet interests, the Polish Communists could not avoid a serious
clash of opinion with independence-minded Polish masses. This almost
continuous conflict had its origin in the "internationalism" of
Polish Communists inherited from Rosa Luxemburg's views, later known
as the heresy of "luxemburgism", which may be summarized in the
following three points:

a) it refused to recognize Lenin's slogan of "national
self-determination", for a social revolution - according
to the classical Marxist version -- would abolish all the
frontiers (hence, "luxemburgism" in this respect was to
the Bolsheviks what cosmopolitism stands for today;)

b) it did not accept Lenin's tactical slogan "land to
peasants" (in order to take the land away from the
peasants and "nationalize" it at a later date,) for
Rosa Luxemburg was for an immediate socialization of
the land;

c) it was against the "proletarian dictatorship"
as carried out by Lenin, i.e. by means of terror, for
it would turn to the dictatorship of a single man.

[page 5]

This ideological inheritance, particularly that
pertaining to the disregard of the principle of national
self-determination, put the Polish Communists in a position of agents of foreign
powers which, from the point of view of Polish national interests
and from the legal point of view, they undoubtedly were. For
instance, during the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1920 the Soviet
invasion was actively supported by the Polish Communists. The Party
went so far as to pass a number of resolutions in favor of "the
armed help of the Russian proletariat." Even after the signing of
the Soviet-Polish peace treaty at Riga in 1921, the KPP never
reconciled itself to the existence of an independent Polish Republic
and never recognized the Polish frontiers established by the treaty.
Consequently in the eastern territories of Poland two separate
Communist Parties were established: the Communist Party of the Western
Ukraine (KPZU) and the Communist Party of Western Byelorussia (KPZE)
with the purpose of detaching these territories from Poland and
incorporating them into the Soviet Union. The theoretical organ of
the Polish Party "Nowe Drogi" (of January 1959) stated quite frankly
that the Communist Party was the only party in Poland which fought
constantly for the separation of the eastern territories from Poland.
The party historian Daniszewski in the "Problems of Peace and
Socialism" (article of January 1959) mentioned above was equally frank
and admitted that the Polish Communists had always demanded that the
eastern territories "incorporated by force into the Polish state"
should be separated "from the bourgeois Polish state."

Again, in January 1933, in the wake of what Communists
believed to be an imminent German Communist revolution and what
turned out to be Hitler's victory, the KPP issued a manifesto "To
the People of Upper Silesia!" affirming its determination to
incorporate Upper Silesia, Pomerania and Danzing into Gemany.
The Manifesto, as quoted by Jan Krzysztof Kwiatkowski in "Komunisci w
Polsce" (Brussels, 1946), declared.

"The assassimn Versailles Treaty, forced upon the German
nation by the coalition of the victorious in the
imperialist war, big imperialist robbers of the Entente, had
torn Upper Silesia, put Danzig under the yoke of
imperialist Poland and created a Polish Corridor which artificially
separated Eastern Prussia from Germany.

The Communist Party of Poland declared that after 11 years
of Polish occupation of Upper Silcsia, the victorious Polish
proletariat... will erase all the verdicts of the Versailles
Treaty concerning Upper Silcsia and the Pomeranian Corridor
and assure the people of these territories the right of
self--determination, to separate from Poland."

[page 6]

Such declarations could only serve to enrage the whole
Polish nation and bring about a further dwindling of whatever
measure of influence the Communists dared claim. In addition to
this setback, the KPP was pestered by internal ideological
deviations which, with the only exception of the so-called "May error",
were but reflections of the Soviet CP ideological and tactical
zig-zags. (It is no wonder that the KPP wag a very small party
and never had more than ten to twelve thousand members).

There were three main phases of factional struggle
within the KPP:

Year 1924 the "rightist" deviation,
Year 1926 the "majorites" - "minorites" split,
Years 1928-1933 - splits in the KPP, in Western Ukraine
and Byelorussian CP'a and in the so-called "appendages"
(i.e. disguised CP branches,) and a final victory of the
"minority" (left) over "majority" (right).

"Rightist" Deviatlon 

The fight against the "rightists" of the KPP which started
in 1924 was in fact a reflex of similar happenings in the Soviet
Union (Stalin-Trotsky) and in Germany (Thaelmann-Brandler).

The issue was rather important from the Communist point of
view. Briefly, it was this: "What was the state of world affairs,
what could be expected to happen and what tactics should
be adopted according to the answer to the two previous questions:

Trotsky's analysis was that the capitalist world had
entered a period of economic stabilization and that the revolutionary
waves had receded. Hence, the Comintern should look for an
understanding with leftist groups of social democratic parties and fight
in common for what was known as "permanent world revolution".

Stalin, who was in favor of the "victory of socialism in
one country" theory and wanted to make the interests of the
Cominform dependent upon these of the victorious country of socialism,
insisted on a "breating spell" which would enable the strengthening
of the Soviet economy and a full subjugation of all other Communist
parties to the Soviet Union. First of all, however, he wanted to get
rid of Trotsky, who had a strong following among Polish Communists.

In order to make Trotsky's views a deviation, branded for
no reason a "rightist" deviation, Stalin made an alliance with

[page 7]

Radek and Kamenev, which coalition brought about a resolution of
the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in July-August 1924 in favor
of the thesis of Stalin.

Already in December 1923, six months "before the Fifth
Congress, the Politburo of the KPP sent a letter to the Central
Committee of the WKPbb) in defense of Trotsky. A sentence of
this letter read as follows) "... to our Party, to the whole
Internationale, and to the whole world revolutionary proletariate
the name of Comrade Trotsky is inseparably bound with the victorious
October Revolution, the Red Army, with Communism and world
revolution."

In these circumstances the fate of the "rightist"
leadership of the Polish CP could not be envied. Warski, Walecki,
Kostrzewa and Pruchniak were removed from their positions In the Politburo
and, together with Henryk Iauer ("Brand",) the secretary of the
Polish Central Committee,were retained in Moscow.

The new leadership of the Polish CP consisted of
"leftists" who had been most zealous in fighting their predecessors,
the "Three W's", as the latter were called after the initials of
their names: Warski Walecki and Wera (Kostrzewa). The new bosses
were:

Lenski (real name Julian Leszczynski)
Domski (cover name Kaminski, real name Henryk Stein
Osinska (cover name "Zoska", real name Unszlicht).

These personal changes did not mean an end of the faction
fight, which continued and which took most violent forms on the
occasion of what was known as 
The "May Error."

In 1926 Warski and Pruchniak, both removed from the
leadership in 1924, were again admitted to the Central Committee KPP
when, of course, they had "confessed" and had been confirmed by
the Third Congress of the Polish CP (1925).

When in May 1926 Pilsudski ventured a coup d'etat the
whole leadership of the KPP decided to support him.

This decision was the more strange in that the Polish
CP had always been against Pilsudski. The explanation may be found

[page 8]

in a general mood prevailing then among Polish working masses.
Workers and all the democratic left sided with Pilsudski. The
Communists followed, more influenced by a general atmosphere
than by an elaborated thesis of the day. The only doctrinal
reason which led them into the trouble was a principle according
to which a Communist Party cannot remain idle while street
fighting or any civil commotion is going on Communists should be in
in order to take over the leadership.

The principle was sound from the Marxist point of view,
but in the circumstances harmful to Moscow. It is no wonder that
the leadership of the Polish CP got a tremendous lashing from
the Kremlin.

The "May error" brought about an ideological split of
the Party into a number of groups, of which the two most
important were:

the majority of the Politburo (hence "majorites") with
Warski as its exponent,

the minority of the Politburo ("minorites") led by
lenski.

The discussion on the "May error" continued for three
years.

Apart from the "May error" issue, there were scores of
minor problems on which new factions and petty groupings were to
crop up from the well fertilized ideological soil. Time and again,
Moscow would make some order out of the mess -- a short-lived order,
of course, -- for its makers would often change their own views
on what was right and what was wrong.

Prom among all these little problems, three deserve
attentions economic stabilization, the role of the PPS (Polish
Socialist Party), the role of the petty bourgeois class.

l)The "majorites" regarded the economic stabilization
of the period as being "relative" or "momentary" {przejsciowa),
but did not, however, deny its existence. The "minorites" opposed
this view as "rightist", and making use of Staling respective
definition were of the opinion that only a "rotten" and, what
follows, a non-existing stabilization could be spoken about.

[page 9]

2) The PPS was meant to represent not only its own
Party interests, but also those of the middle and small-holding
peasantry, the working intelligentsia, middle and lower groups
of petty bourgeois class and of the so-called "top" of the
workers class. As to the role of the PPS, the majority faction of
the Polish CP made a "rightist" error, for they said that this
role was double-edged, that Is to say in order to have the
masses on their side, Social1sts had to use some slogans which,
objectively speaking, act in favor of the revolution. This thesis
of "double-edgedness" (oboslecznosc) was immediately used
up by the "mlnorites" in their violent attacks upon the "majorites",
and became a favorite subject of continuous discussions.

3) In the years 1921-1923 the role of the petty
bourgeois was discussed. Wera Kostrzewa put forward a thesis on "the
independent role" of this class. This time it was again "majorites"
who sinned. The theory happened to be "rightist", and after the
Kay coup an anathema was thrown on the heresy by the Comintern.
The "majorites" must have been Incorrigible sinners, because in
spite of what had already been found a heresy they made the same
error when they said that the Sejm (Polish Parliament) was an
instrument in the hands of petty bourgeois in the latter's struggle
against Pilsudski's dictatorship. Again an "independent role" and
again anathemas.

The last Stage 

The third and the last stage of factional fights falls
in the period of 1928-1933 when serious splits developed in
various Party organizations and the "majorites" (or "rightists")
were eventually removed from all the leading positions.

A severe crisis took place in the PKZU and KPZB (CP's
of the Western Ukraine and of Western Byelorussia, that is to say
of these Polish territories which were regarded by the USSR to
be parts of the Ukraine and Byelorussia.) The bone of contention
was Soviet policy of russianization carried on in the Soviet parts
of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. It should be kept in mind that
both PEZU and KPZB received orders from Moscow to organize acts
of sabotage and of terror in Western Poland. To a large extent
Moscow was responsible also for the growth of nationalism,
especially for Ukrainian nationalism. Such a trend would not be
allowed to develop in the USSR, but on orders of the Kremlin it was
supported by Communists in Poland. What was a crime to a Soviet

[page 10]

Ukrainian was an act of duty to a Polish Ukrainian Communist.
Too many member a of the KPZU and of the KPZB saw clearly the
maochiavellian methods of the Soviets. These people broke off
the Party. In the KPZU the whole leadership and large groups
of the rank and file rebelled.

These happenings were also influenced by a wavering
attitude of the Polish OP. According to the caprices of Moscow,
the acts of sabotage and terror performed by Ukrainian
nationalists were regarded by the. KPP once as a "bourgeois provocation",
once as an expression of the fight of "people's masses".

This "tic-tac" policy brought about a split in the
Warsaw Party organization which rebelled against the then (1928)
"majorite" Central Committee. The latter dissolved the Warsaw
Committee and appointed a new one. The old Committee did not
accept this decision and continued in office. This brought about
a situation in which the Warsaw Communist community had two
competing bishops until the Sixth Congress of the Comintern made
null and void the decision of the national Central Committee, and
removed the two men most involved in the affairs Rylski (real name
Lubieniecki) a "majorite", and Henrychowski (real name Saul
Amsterdam), a "minorite".

At that time the Comintern led a double-front attack
against the "ultraleft" and against the "right". Hence, the order
issued to Polish Communists was a unique one: the conflicting
parties should make peace and the XPP should "consolidate". It
was too late to speak about peace- The factional fight had already
gone to the point of breaking personal relations between "majorites"
and "minorites". Eventually, Molotov gave the order. 

After the fall of Bukharin, who was a "rightist", Molotov
took over the comintern. He aided with the minority faction of the
KPP, be it only for the fact that Bukharin was for the majority.
Step by step, Molotov removed Polish "majorites" from Party
positions- In 1933 the KPP was led entirely by "minorites".

The "majorites" were called to Moscow and were assigned
various jobs either abroad in Comintern and Profintern (Communist
TU Internationale) organisations, or in Soviet Russia, in economic
and other offices and enterprises.

Subsequently one by one they were recalled to Moscow
and arrested, The wave of arrests did rot spare the "minorites"
either.
[page 11]

In April 1938 the Comintern decided to dissolve the KPP
under the pretext that it had been infiltrated by police
provocateurs and agents of the Polish Military Intelligence. All its
leaders and activists were liquidated on Stalin's orders, and the
remaining members were sent to slave labor camps where many of them
perished.

This mass extermination of the Polish Communists was to
some extent mitigated by the ironical fact that some of them were
at that time in Polish prisons and consequently out of danger.
They were about the only Polish Communists to survive the purge.

[page 12]

II

The New Communist Party: the PPR (1942-1948)

The Polish Workers Party (PPR) the successor of the
ill-fated KPP, was established at the beginning of 1942. It was
composed of the remnants of Polish Communists who survived in
Poland and who constituted mostly rank and file Communists, at
best members of the former middle Party apparatus (e.g. Gomulka).
The rest were in Russia, and consisted of those who survived the
Stalin purge of the late thirties in the Soviet Union, who either
escaped to the USSR in the face of the invading German armies
September 1939) or who lived in the eastern part of Poland
overrun and annexed by USSR at the same time. As time went on a clear
division arose between two groups: "kraijowcy" (natives) or those
who lived under the German occupation in Poland, and the much more
influential group of those imported, during and after the occupation,
from the USSR.

The Party as a group and its members individually, took
a considerable time to recover from a series of organizational and
ideological crises. There were recent memories of the dissolution
of the KPP, the only CP to have ever been dissolved in the history
of Communist movement, of the brutal purge of its leadership, of the
Soviet-Nazi alliance of 1939-1941. There were no leaders of any stature
left in Poland and there were none in Russia.

In these circumstances the new leaders were chosen from
among the middle Party apparatus. Stalin realized that they should
be known to at least certain circles of Polish Communists, and the
choice fell on former KPP members who were genuine Poles and who
had spent the pre-war years in Poland. At the beginning of 1942
some of them were refugees In Moscow. So it happened that the core
of the new leadership had to be dropped into Poland by parachute.
Three names deserve attention: Marceli ITowotko, Pawel Finder and
Malgorzata Fornalska. Later on they were joined by those leaders
who were in Poland (e.g. Gomulka).

At that time the Polish Home Army and the Polish parties
of every political persuasion had already been engaged in
underground armed resistance against the German occupation for more than
two years. The attitude of the whole nation was one of stubborn
resistance against the occupant.

In order to gain any following the Communists had to join
the resistance movement. They did so although their aim was different
from that of the nation. The Communist aim was first to help the
Soviet Union in its struggle against Germany, second to pave the
way for a Communist domination of Poland. To achieve the latter they
tried to destroy all active elements in the Polish underground
state in order to make the achievement of true Polish independence
more difficult. The secretary-general of the PPR and a Communist
hero of today, Marceli Nowotko, had been entrusted by Moscow with
a mission to discover the network of the Polish underground movement
and to destroy it in close collaboration with the Gestapo.

(over)

[page 13]

Consequently Nowotko created a special department for this purpose,
which actively helped the Nazis to hunt down and dispose of the
Polish leaders.

The close collaboration of the PPR with the Gestapo had
unforeseen consequences. Two young Polish Communists, the brothers
Molojec, convinced that Nowotko was a Gestapo agent shot him in
the street (in November 1942) and were later executed by the Communists
(cf. "News from Behind the Iron Cutrau", The Swiatlo Story, Vol.4,
No. 3, 1955).

This taught the Communists a lesson, and they probably
stopped or limited their collaboration with the Gestapo, At any
rate, Nowotko's successor, Pawel Finder himself fell a victim of
the Gestapo terror; he was arrested in November 1943 and later shot
He was succeeded as secretary-general of the Party by Wladyslaw
Gomulka, who inherited a small Party and a not very important factor
in the underground movement. The Communist role, however, increased
rapidly as the Soviet armies approached the Polish frontier.

To create the appearances of democratic institutions,
the Communists set up their own underground parliament under the
name of "Krajowa Rada Narodowa" (National Council of the Homeland).
Its chairman, Boleslaw Bierut, was an old Comintern agent, trained
in Moscow, and blindy obedient to Stalin. Of the 19 participants
of the first session of the KRN (31 December 1943-1 January 1944)
at least 17 were Communists, who, however, claimed to represent
14 "groups" of various political and social bodies. At least in this
instance there was much truth in the claim since these "groups" were
simply Communist agents ("plants") within these bodies.

There seems to be little doubt that Bierut (parachuted
into Poland in 1943) was sent by Moscow as a trusted Stalin agent to
keep an eye on the "native" ("kraowe") leadership of the Party.
Future developments fully confirmed this mission and as early as
1943 an incident occurred which was a grim pointer for the future:
"In consequence of obstacles of a varied nature" Wladyslaw Gomulka
and his two closest friends, Zenon Kliszko and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski,
did not take part in the first session of the KKft, although they
were its members.

The first decree of the Council (KRN) passed during the
fateful night (31 December I943-1 January 1944) concerned the creation
of the People's Army (Armia Ludowa) as "a basic armed force of the
Polish nation".

Through these steps the Polish Communists set up a pattern
of future domination. The principle of "proletarian dictatorship"
was expressed by the Party, the administrative organ of the state
was embodied in the KM (which took over the functions of a
parliament and a government at the same time) while its armed power
was to be the AL ("People's Army").

At the same time similar pattern was set up in the Soviet
Union where -- as distinct from Communist institutions in Poland --

(over)

[page 14]

two bodies were created: The Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP)
which formally was a social body but actually performed the functions
of both a Party and a government, and a small Polish army consisting
at the beginning of Just one division, the Kosciussko Division.

Thus, despite the establishment of the Polish Workers
Party in Poland, Stalin, always, distrustful of Poles, set up in
Moscow another Polish Communist body under his own direct control.
As head of the Tinion of Polish Patriots Stalin chose a Polish
writer, Wanda Wssliewska, who became during the war a Soviet
citizen and a member of the Surpeme Soviet. The real aim of
the Union of Polish Patriots was to force upon Poland a Communist
regime, with the help of the Soviet army, although the organization
never stopped proclaiming that its aim was "free and independent"
Poland.

One of the main tasks of the Union of Polish Patriots was
to help to organize the small Polish army set up in the USSR; its
commander was General Zygmunt Berling. This army was never
proclaimed to be a Communist army, but its political leadership rested
with Communists selected by the Union, and its officers, particularly
higher rank: officers, were regular Red Army officers - either pure
Russians or Russians of Polish origin. This Army marched toward
Poland alongside the Soviet Army, and in August 1944 approached
Warsaw.

At that time the two embryo institutions of Communist
domination (Polish and Russian) were already fused into one. On
21 July 1944, the KRN set up in Lublin a Committee of national
liberation (the "Lublin Committee") composed of fake representatives
of various political parties and entirely dominated by the Communists.
The Committee issued its Manifesto on 22 July 1944 officially
confirming the fusion of Communist organizations get up in Poland and
in Russia, and proclaiming that these organizations were the only
legal bodies of state power and the only representatives of the
Polish nation.

The Communist Tactics

It is relevant and necessary even in this short study to
say a few words on the Communist tactics of the time. In an attempt
at deceiving the Polish masses, the Communists created their own
organizations and parties parallel to the existing polish organizations
and parties, under the same or similar names, For instance the
underground Polish Parliament in which all Polish political parties
participated was called : Rada Jednosci Narodowej (Council of
National Unity) , The Communists created their own Krajowa Rada
Narodowa (National Council of the Homeland) and this unrepresentative
body took over the functions of an interim Parliament. The name
of the Polish underground army was Amia Krajowa (Home Army), the
Communists called their partisans Armia Ludowa (People's Army).

The same tactics were applied to political parties.
Through their agents or allies within these parties the Communists

(over)

[page 15]

set up their own organisations. The example of the Peasant Party
(Stronnictwo Ludowe) is typical. A pro-Communist splinter group
usurped the name of the wellknown Stronnictwo Ludowe (SL).When
the peasant leader Stanislaw Mikolajczyk arrived in Poland (from
London via Moscow) his peasant party had to drop its traditional
name and assume a new one: Polskie Stronnictwo ludowe (PSL).

The Emergence of the Polish United Workers' Party

The Communists never had any strong workers following
in Poland. The only influential workers' party both before and after
the war was the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). Although the
leadership of the post-war PPS was composed of Communist agents or
sympathizers, the traditional name of the new party attracted the
masses of workers who instead of joining the PPR -- as the Communists
would have liked -- thought that the PPS though different from the
genuine pre-war PPS) was the right organization guarding their
interests.

For these reasons the Communists decided to bring about
an official merger of the two parties: the PPS and the PPR. This
was accomplished at the so-called Merger Congress (16-21 December
1948) when the present ruling party: the Polish United Workers
Party (PZPR) was born. As is evident from the name of the new
party, the PPS disappeared while the PPR remained under its old
name to which one "Z" (for united) was added. At the beginning there
were many ex-Socialists elected to the highest Party organs, but
their representation was sharply reduced as time went one.
Gomulka's Nationalist Deviation

Gomulka's first term of power as secretary-general (a title
corresponding to the present first secretary) of the Party lasted
from November 1943 to 6 September 1948 when, at a Party conference,
Boleslaw Bierut delivered a crushing speech against him. As already
pointed out, Stalin was distrustful of Polish Communists, and would
stand only those whom he regarded as his blind servants. Bierut
was one.

Gomulka was never a "democrat" or a "liberal". He was a
ruthless Communist who did not hesitate using extreme terror in
the fight with his political opponents. He crushed the Mikolajczyk
Polish Peasant Party whose members were arrested, tortured and even
murdered. By similar means he also softened up the PPS to make
it ripe for the merger with Communists. But he wanted to be master
in his own house, and opposed Soviet interference into every detail
of Polish Communist policy and tactics.

While he most ruthlessly introduced Communism in Poland,
he was speaking of "Polish road to Communism" long before 1948,
His attitude to the Soviet Union was made clear in an article
he wrote in connection with the Party Plenum in May 1945: "There are
two reasons why Poland cannot be a Soviet republic, Firstly - this
is not desired by the Polish nation, secondly this is not desired

(over)

[page 16]

by the Soviet Union... The PPR as a party participating in the
coalition government and as a party most deeply connected with
the Polish nation takes over the standpoint of sovereignty and
independence of Poland from the democratic spirit of the Polish
nation". In the same article he wrote that the task of "reaction"
was made easier by spreading rumors about "kolkhozes". On the
subject of kolkhozes there was also a mention in the resolution
of the Plenum of 26 May 1945: "The Central Committee states that
hostile propaganda of reaction, intimidating the peasants' masses
by alleging that there' are the tendencies and efforts of the Polish
Workers Party and of the Provisional Government, toward the
'sovietisation' of Poland and collectivization of the agriculture,
is made easy by the sectarian tendencies of certain members of
the Party and some- rash instructions of the lower authorities of
the state apparatus."

Another sin or political error of Gomulka was his
opposition to the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform, although he
did not actually pparticipate in. the Bucharest session of the
Cominform at which the Yugoslav CP was expelled from that body (28 June
1948).

In fact from mid-June till early September 1948 he did
not appear in public. This was the period of the busy Plenary
Sessions of the Central Committee in June, July, August, which
ended with a conference in September, At the June Plenum Gomulka
delivered, without submitting it to the opinion of the Politburo,
the speech on "the historic traditions of the Polish workers' movement".
This speech was never published but according to "Bierut "was
undoubtedly a conscious revision of Leninist appreciation of the
history of our movement, based on the complete divorce of the struggle
for national independence from the class struggle".

All this brought about Gomulka's downfall. The charges
leveled against him were summarized in the following three points:

1. He underestimated the decisive role of the Bolshevik
Party in the struggle against imperialism and surrendered to the
nationalistic and bourgeois influences.

2. He did not understand the necessity of the sharp
class struggle against the peasant capitalists (kulaks).

3. He favored conciliatory tactics toward the leaders
of the Yugoslav Communist Party not realizing the essence of their
deviation.

Despite these grave charges Gromulka retained [*] for the time
being most (of his previous positions, the Central Committee taking
into consideration his achievements in the struggle against the
"reactionary policy" of Mikolajczyk and against the "reborn fascism
supported by Anglo-American imperialism". The post of the
secretary--general of the Party went to Bierrut, but G-omulka still remained
a member of the Politburo, a member of the Central Committee of the
Party, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Regained Territories

(over)

[page 17]

In the Government, and deputy to the Sejm. But his downfall had
begun and three years later was to end in his imprisonment.

At the "Merger Congress" of December 1948 ha was not
elected to Politburo. On 20 January 1949 he was relieved of his
government posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the
Regained Territories, allegedly, at his own request. He still
remained a member of the Central Committee and a deputy to the Sejm.
In March 1949 he was appointed Vice-President of the Supreme
Chamber of State Control, and after being released from that position
he was given the quite insignificant job of one of the directors
of the State Social Security Fund.

At the third Plenum of the Party (11 to 13 November 1949)
he, along with Zenon Kliszko, was dismissed from the Central
Committee and deprived of the right to perform any function within
the Party. On 31 October 1951 the Sejm "acceded to the request
made by the Public Prosecutor-that legal proceedings be instituted
against Gomulka who is guilty of practices contrary to the interest
of the Polish People's Republic". His parliamentary immunity was
withdrawn, and he was arrested.

According to Lt. Col. Swiatlo (a senior Security offical
who escaped to the West in December 1935) he was imprisoned in a
comfortable villa, which the Ministry of Public Security had
maintained especially for such prominent prisoners, and was treated
well. Swiatlo says also that no member of the Central Committee
would undertake the task of interrogating Gomulka, and consequently
three senior officers of the Security Service were detailed to
that job. They also were not overburdened by their task, since,
throughout the whole period of Gomulka's imprisonment he was
interrogated for perhaps 15 days only. All those years, says Swiatlo,
were spent on collecting and arranging materials against him, but
the Security Service was unable to produce anything coherent against
him that could satisfy the requirements of Elerut, though Moscow
pressed Warsaw for a speedy trial. The death of Stalin and the
change of atmosphere in the Communist world brought about his
release from jail in September 1954.

[page 18]

III

The Bierut Era

When Boleslaw Bierut took over the leadership of the
Party on 6 September 1948 the spade work of the consolidation
of Communist power in the country had already been done by
Gomulka and his assistants: Hilary Mine (economic matters),
Jakub Berman (Party ideology and supervision over instruments
of terror), Boman Zambrowski (organization of state structure),
Marian Spychalski (military), and Jersy Borejsza (press and
cultural matters). However, this was just the initial stage, and
much remained to be done to model the Party and the society
according to the wishes of Stalin.

Hardly a year had passed since the Merger Congress of
the PZPR when the pattern of a new era (known as Stalinist or
Bierut era) was set. Personal changes in the Party leadership
(Politburo) were closely connected with the hardening of the
course. Only three names continued to appear on the list of
Politburo: Hilary Minc, Jakub Berman and Roman Zamlbrowski. New
were added. Of these the most important were: Stanislaw
Radkiewicz (chief of the secret police), Aleksander Zawadzki Franciszek
Mazur, Hilary Ohelchowski, Zenon Nowak, and Edward Ochab, all
diehard Communists and obedient followers of the Party (at that time
Stalin) line. To preserve the appearances of workers' unity two
names of former PPS members continue to appear in the lists of the
Polithbunase Jozef Cyrankiewics and Adam Rapacki. These two were
no simple stooges or easy tools of the Communists. They seemed
to be just clever opportunists who knew their precarious position,
and did not exceed the limits placed on them by the exigencies of
the new hard course.

Great changes occurred during 1949 in the life of the
country. At a congress of culture and science workers in Szczecin
Marxist (Stalinist) teaching was adopted as the only inspiration.
Following this decision and "helped" by dismissals and the terror
the Polish press, literature and science switched to socialist
realism and Stalinism.

In November 1949 the Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski
took over the Polish armed forces. Marian Spychalski the Deputy
Minister of Defense was removed (13 November 1949) from all Party

[page 19]

posts and from his military command, later imprisoned and charged
of "right nationalistic deviation."). A brutal purge of Polish
high ranking officers followed, then a series of public and
secret trials at which several of them were condemned to death.

The secret police (controlled by Radkiewicz) slowly
gained a position of limitless power. Communist
dictatorship was replaced by simple police terror modeled on Soviet MVD examples.

A powerful youth organization modeled on the Soviet
Komsomol was set up under the name of Union of Polish Youth (ZMP)
led by two relatively young Communists: Jarzy Morawski and
Wladyslaw Matwin. Admissions to higher educational establishments,
scholarship grants, etc. were made dependent either on membership in
the ZMF or on the Union's favorable opinion.

In 1952 a new Constitution of the Polish People's Republic
was proclaimed, and new elections to the Sejm produced a rubber
stamp "parliament" automatically approving all the decrees passed
by the Communist government.

Peace and order, in Stalinist meaning of the words,
settled. The Communist hierarchy lived in luxury, the workers were
terrorized, the peasants either collectivized (since 1949 till
1956 over 10,000 collective farms -- kolkhozes -- were established)
or ruined by excessive taxation and compulsory deliveries.

The ideological unity of the Party was assured. Supreme
loyalty to Stalin and to the Soviet CP was expressed publicly
at every occasion. Soviet officers led the Army, and Soviet
"advisors" controlled the economic and political life of the country.

After the Death of Stalin

This undisturbed state of "peace" continued to Stalin's
death in March 1953. The introduction of "collective leadership"
in the Soviet CP, the "thaw" and an almost automatic loosening
of the grip after-the death of the tyrant brought about the first
ideological confusion into the PZPR leadership- Against this
background two tendencies emerge, though it is difficult to say that
the partisans of these tendencies were organized in Party factions:

1) a dictatorial tendency aiming at the retention of the
conditions existing in the "previous period", inimical
to all liberal trends evident among the intellectuals

[page 20]

(cf. Adam Wazyk's "Poem for the Adults" published
in August 1955). The exponents of this tendency
were already in mid-1955 called Stalinists. Edward
Ochab, the "toothy Bolshevik1' as Stalin called him
on an occasion, is regarded as the leader of that
dictatorial or Stalinist group.

2) a liberal tendency whose exponent seemed to be
Cyrankiewicz. Unofficial sources claim that
Cyrankiewics, trying to make the best of the Kremlin
struggle for power and of the resulting confusion
among the Soviet CP leadership, aimed at further
liberalization of the Party life (inner-Party
democracy) and of its policy in the country. In case
of Soviet intervention -- Gyrankiewica is said to
have argued -- the PZPR was ready to atop at the
stage it had achieved at the moment of the
intervention and retain the status quo of that moment but not
draw back to Stalinist conditions.

However, almost nothing changed in the internal structure
of the Party leadership or in the life of the Party, The Second
Party Congress (10-17 March 1954) dealt with economic and
organisational matters, and seemed to affirm the existing status quo
of limitless power of the Party and of its leader Bierut, The
change occurred only after his a death in Moscow on 12 March 1956
and after the contents of Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th
Congress of the CPSU had become known in Poland.

[page 21]

IV

Wladyslaw Gomuka's Return to Power

On 20 March 1956 Edward Ochab, was elected first secretary
of the Party. Although already during Bierut's lifetime he was
regarded as his logical successor, his election was a compromise
solution between Franciszek Masur (who was supported by Khrushchev
but apparently disliked by the Polish Communists) and Roman
Zambrowski (who was opposed by Khrushchev because of his Jewish
origin). Ochab was a bad choice for the leading post. Always a
faithful follower of the Party line he was used to accepting and
carrying out orders rather than issuing the orders. It. must be
said by way of defense that the situation within the Party was
not enviable to any leader. The shock brought about by Khrushchev's
revelations about Stalin and the ensuing ideological disintegration
of the Party and ZMP (youth) produced a state of chaos and an almost
total disappearance of the authority of Party leadership.

These revelations did not constitute the only blow to Party
authority in Poland. In 1954 the whole Poland was shocked by the
revelations of former high ranking officer of the Polish Secret
police (Ministry of Public Security), Lt. Col. Josef Swiatlo who in
December 1953 escaped to Eerlin and thence to the United State. All
the abuses of the Party and of the secret police cane to light.
Bierut presorted to the half measures of reorganising the security
service in name rather than in essence (the Ministry was abolished
and a Committee for the Matters of Public Security established),
and of demoting Stanislaw Radkiewicz, the Minister of Public
Security, to the rank of Minister of State Farms, However, this was
not enough. The pressure of public opinion was too strong. At the
Third Plenum of the CC (January 1955) the problem of the security
service was further discussed and a resolution passed regarding
the work of the service and "the control of the Party" over its
organs.

But it wag Edward Ochab who had to deal more energetically
with the problem. Three high ranking officers of the former
Ministry of Public Security, Roman Romkowski, Anatol Fejgin and Josef
Eosanski, were arrested and sentenced. Several arrests of minor
police officers followed-. At the same time several political
prisoners were set free and rehabilitated. All these steps simply
underlined Swiatlo's revelations and instead of contributing toward

[page 22]

Party popularity increased the distrust of the population and
of the Party membership. The Posnan rising of June 1956 and its
bloody suppression revealed the extent of people's misery and
dissatisfaction, and brought about a further disintegration of
Party and state authority.

In addition to being gravely frightened, the Party
leadership split into more groups according to the lines of
policy each section favored in order to cope with the situation,
A third tendency appeared alongside the dictatorial and liberal
tendencies discussed in previous chapters -- that of a "middle
of the road" policy of some liberalization but strictly inspired
and controlled by the Party. The exponent of this group was said
to be Roman Zambrowski. This so-called Pulawaka group (from the
name of a street in Warsaw) comprised among others the following
CC members: Stefan Jedrychowski, Bugeniusz Szyr (both economic
planners), Stefan ZolkiewsKi (cultural and educational expert),
and Antcni Alster (secret police). The group opposed the "thaw"
and liberalization, and in this respect almost shared the
Stalinis group's views. They divided with Stalinists on the issue
of anti-Semitism (advocated by Stalinists) and on the issue of tactics.
Zambrowski and his group understood that the Party could not afford
-- at the given moment -- a ruthless suppression of liberalization.

The Stalinist group, also known as the Natolin group (from
the name of a suburban Warsaw locality), thought that the Polish
masses could be pacified by the removal and persecution of a number
of Jews in high Party and government positions (the would be
scapegoats: Mine, Herman, and a number of secret police officers),
opposed liberalization at every cost, and leaned heavily on Soviet
help (direct armed intervention if necessary) in retaining power.
The chief exponents of the group were: Zenon Nowak, Franciszek
Mazur, Wiktor Klosiewios (the Trade Union boas), Kazimierz Mijal,
Bole slaw Ruminski and General Kasimiers Witaszewski (Deputy Defense
Minister for political and educational matters.)

The Poznan rising helped the three tendencies to
crystalize. First of all Cyrankiewics came out almost publicly for
liberalization. Then Ochab was reported to have deserted the dictatorial
group, apparently under the influence of Gomulka with whom he had
several conferences.

The composition of the "liberal" group was less clear.
It seemed to be the largest group but was poorly organized. Of
the members of the Politburo only Cyrankiewicz and Adam Rapacki

[page 23]

belonged to it. Within the Central Committee almost all former
members of the PPS were reported to be "liberal". They were Oskar
Lange, Konstanty Dabrowski, and Marian Rybicki. Two young
Communists, members of the CC, also seemed to have such tendencies:
Wladyslaw Matwin and Jerzy Morawski. Although not well organized,
this group was most powerful, thanks to the support of Party and
non-Party intellectuals and of the nation as a whole. What was
most important, the groups had the support of the youth inspired
by bold articles of the mouthpiece of young Communist
intellectuals, "Po Prostu".

October 1956 

In October 1956 the incredible happened, During the
historic Eighth Plenum of the Party Wladyslaw Gomulka was elected
member of the CC (19 October 1956), and in spite of Khrushchev's
personal intervention was elected the first secretary of the Partly
on 21 October 1956.

It is not intended in this short study to write a
description of the events following Gomulka's election, of the wave
of enthusiasm and high hopes in drastic changes since these events
are generally known. It will be enough to summarize briefly the
decisions taken at the Eighth Plenum (under Gomulka): the
acceptance of the principle of voluntary collectivisation of the
countryside (as a result 90 per cent of collective farms dissolved almost
at once), cutting down of the economic growth of industry to the
possibilities of the country more than to the requirements of the
Soyiet Union, the abolition of police terror and the establishment
of 'socialist legality, the establishment of a road to socialism"
different from that dictated by the Soviet Union and adapted to
Polish conditions.

Further practical steps taken by Gomulka were ??
release of Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski from imprisonment and a
reconciliation with the Church and his popular dismissal of Marshal
Rokossowski and a number of other senior Soviet officers from
their commands in the Polish Army.

Events have shown that all these steps were clever tactical
moves aimed at restoring the Party position in the country. This
is most evident from a confidential letter of the Central Committee
of the Party issued in Warsaw in February 1957, after the victorious
January elections to the Sejm. The letter, addressed to Party
organizations, simply reaffirmed that nothing had changed in the

[page 24]

Communist nature of the state, and that all attempts of
"reactionaries" at restoring any sort of "bourgeois" society would be
dealt with promptly.

Factions and Deviations

The most important part of the letter concerned the
situation within the Party, torn by factional struggle. The letter
stated:

"The most urgent task is to fight all the deviations
from the line of the Eighth Plenum of the CC: against
revisionism and liberal petty bourgeois nationalist or anarchistic
digressions from the principles of the program of our Party, against
sectarianism, dogmatism and attempts at returning to the old bureaucratic
and administrative methods of leading and ruling."

What were all these deviations and factions? These were
described in a contribution by Ernst Halperin to "Der Monat" (of
March 1957). Helperin described a meeting in Warsaw with an old
friend, a member of the Party hierarchy and a follower of Gomulka.
It is worth repeating at length what this Communist told Halperin:

"At present, we are living through a serious crisis of the
Party. The enthusiasm and unity of the days in October (1956)
proved to be a brief inebriation. Now we have a hang-over- The
Party is split into several groups.

"The present crisis really started as early as July (1956)
after the Posnan Revolt. We were not certain then what attitude
to assume with regard to Poznan, and what consequences to draw
from this bad failure, For technical reasons alone it was
impossible to represent Foznan as the result of an imperialist conspiracy.
False admissions would have had to be produced to this purpose. And
during the months preceding Posnan, a large number of officials
of the security police and of the office of the attorney-general
had been punished and imprisoned because they had extorted false
admissions during the big purge of 1949 to 1953, The authorities
entrusted with the investigation of the Poznan affair had no
intention of exposing themselves to the same danger by extorting
further admissions. They gave a truthful report of the
investigation which included no mention of the machinations of imperialist agents.

"Toward the end of June, high Soviet visitors arrived in
Warsaw, namely Bulganin and Marshal Zhukov. They made a very

[page 25]

simple and skillful proposal. The Poznan Revolt was to be blamed
on the bad economic situation of the workers, and the wrath of
the people directed mainly against the security police. Who,
however, was responsible for the bad economic policy of the regime?
The highest leader of planning, the Jew Hilary Mine! And who
until recently had controlled the security police? The man most
hated in the whole country, the Jew Jakub Berman! Let's therefore
have a trial of Berman and Mine, thereby regaining the confidence
of the people.

"The large majority of the leadership of the Party,
however, rejected this way out. The Seventh Plenum of the Central
Committee (in July 1956) decided to take on the collective
responsibility for Poznan and to promise abasic political and economic
change of policy. There was only a small minority, faithful to Moscow,
which formed the Natolin group, which refused to submit to the decision
of the Party and started making anti-Semitic propaganda of its own
in accordance with Moscow's directives.

"As late as October (1956), the Natolin-people were in
complete isolation. But then a second group of conservatives came
into being. I will call them the neo-Stalinists in contrast to the
old Stalinists Natolin-guard. They were people who to some extent
had welcomed Gomulka's coming to power enthusiastically, and who
participated considerably in the preparation and the execution
of the October Revolution. Then, however, they began to slow down,
They were afraid that democratization might go too far, that it
might lead to the ideological and political rupture with the
"socialist camp" on the one hand, and to the end of the rule of the
Party, hence the loss of their own position of power, on the other.
Even though they did not want to have anything to do with the
Natolin-people, were even personally hostile to them, a
cooperation in factual questions began to evolve such as, for instance,
in the opposition against Gomulka's agricultural policy which
assures the peasants of their property right to their land.

"Ever since, the formation of groups in the Party has
even progressed further. Today, the following groups exist
within the Partys first the Natolin-people or the old-Stalinists;
secondly the neo-Stalinists who after the October (1956) events
split from the reform movement. Both of these groups are being
backed by the overhelming majority of the Party apparatus. Thirdly
there are Gomulka's personal followers who are working closely
with the former social-democrats of the circle around Prime
Minister Cyrankiewicz. They have but weak representation in the Party

[page 26]

apparatus, but have a very strong following among average members
and among the workers generally. Fourthly there are the people
who believe that Gomulka did not go far enough, who are reproaching
him with having too much consideration for the Soviet Union in his
foreign policy and for the Stalinists with regard to domestic
affairs. This last group may be again divided into two groups: Those
who approve of the evolution toward a parliamentary mutliple-party
system and those who demand a complete change of our political and
economic system on the Yugoslav pattern, including the autonomy of
factories and municipalities..."

Was the Party so unharmonious a mosaic as Halperin's
friend made out? Almost all observers at the time would have
agreed with him. Gomulka's speech at the 10th Plenum (24 October
1957) confirms the impression: 

"Ideological confusion is the cause of the decomposition
of the unity of the Party organization. In the present
state of affairs the Party is only formally unified as
an organization. In fact, two wings are at work within
the Party which in a more or leas explicit manner, are
opposing the Party line, sabotaging the decisions of the
supreme Party authorities.

"It is true that neither the one nor the other of the
wings existing within the Party has assumed the
organizational form of a faction, but this fact does not
at all affect the extent of the damage which they bring
to the Party while carrying on various forms of group
activity. I would even say that it is easier to cope
with a faction which openly presents its program of
action, than with a formally unorganized group mixture which
most of the time endeavors to hide behind the Party line
and at the same time is carrying on its own policy. Such
a state of affairs introduces disorientation and
confusion into the Party ranks. This results in a whole chain
of negative consequences".

The greatest dangers to the Party Gomulka considered to
be the revisionists and the dogmatists. Each of these factions
was again splintered into several groups. This is how Gomulka
presented the situation to the 10th Plenum:

"The wing that I call revisionist is by no means composed
of revisionists only. The revisionist group proper is
very small. But the results of its activities are dangerous
[page 27]

In a wide range. Because the revisionists utilized and
are partly still utilizing various means of propaganda
especially a part of the press and certain periodicals.

"The best representative of the revisionist wing was
'Po Prostu'.

Shoulder to shoulder with them are standing the disguised
opponents of socialism, people who joined the Party guided
by their self-interest, so alien to the Party. There is
no room in the Party for either of them.

"There is a third category, which could not easily be
considered as belonging to the revisionist wing in the Party
and which at the same time could not be spoken of as
keeping to the Party line. These are the Party members who
yield to revisionism, are under its influence, and adopt
a wavering attitude toward the Party line. They constitute
the periphery of the revisionist wing... 
"The revisionist wing must be severed from the Party. On
such wings the Party, People's Poland and socialism could
only fly into an abyss...

"We shall liquidate with equal determination any organized
or individual manifestations of anti-Party activities
conducted from a position of dogmatism. For such people there
cannot be any room in the Party either.

"Among the advocates of the dogmatic-sectarian attitude
one can find some who reject all the transformations
which have been taking place in the last few years in
the international workers' movement. Even the Twentieth
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which
opened such vast, new prospects before socialism, is
described as a 'great misfortune' to the workers1 movement.

"This dogmatic-sectarian attitude and, the longing for a
return to the old methods can only separate the Party
from the broad working masses and are thus objectively
playing into the hands of forces hostile to socialism.

Gomulka then presented his own analysis of the Party
members. He divided them into the following groups:

[page 28]

"The first group are the Communists conscious of their
purpose, irrespective of whether they came originally
from the Communist Party of Poland and the Polish Workers
Party or the Polish Socialist Party...

The second group includes members of the Party who
support socialism with heart and reason. They are good Party
members, although not very lively or active.

"The third group are people who joined the Party for their
own interests. This group is a mill-stone around the neck
of the Party. It is the Party's unnecessary and harmful
burden. This group is considerable in size. In principle
this group should leave the Party...

"There is also in the Party a special category of people
particularly undesirable. These are trouble-makers,
demagogues and double-faced people, full of negation of
socialism and of the Party leadership. Recently we even had
strikes organized and demagogic demands put forward by
Party members of this sort.

"There are also devoted followers of the Church and
clergy, conducting activities contrary to Party policy.

"Finally there are various speculators and purely criminal
elements, who disguise their motives behind a screen of
apparent Party activity."

Gromulka decided that a drastic purge must be carried out
from top to the bottom- He declared: 

"We must cleanse the Party of liquidators and revisionists
and of organizers of group activity opposed to the general
line of the Party, free the Party from climbers and corrupt
people who are morally decayed, rid ourselves of elements
alien to the socialist idea, free the Party from
trouble--makers, inveterate drunkards and adventurers, from the
cumbersome burden of people indifferent to the Party and
socialism." 

[page 29]

The Stalinist (Natolin) Opposition

And so the purge or "verification" began. Everybody
assumed that the "verification" would-be directed first of all
against Gomulka's most bitter enemies, the Stalinists, since they
were waging against him a campaign of slander and abuse.
They had not for a moment ceased to plot against him, counting on at
least the unofficial support and blessing of Moscow.

At every meeting of the Central Committee or the
provincial Committee's, bitter assaults on Gomulka's policies were
made. Gomulka was not entirely passive in the face of this
barrage. At a meeting of the Central Committee in May 1957,
when Kazimierz Mijal, a former minister of Local Government,
demanded that the Polish Party "must acknowledge the primacy
of the Soviet Union" Gomulka told him bluntly he was for
internationalism but not for servility. Ochab was even more
outspoken. He told the Stalinists:

"We have had enough speeches written with imported
ink... We do not want foreign patterns and lectures.
Some people ask that the phrase 'with the Soviet Union
at the head' should always be used. This is not always
a just principle. In some instances when this has been
unjustly used, it has cost us a great deal."

The Central Committee on this occasion, decided to
expel from the Party one of the most powerful of the Stalinists,
Jakub Berman, the former Minister of Security, Stanislaw Radkiewicz
and one of the chiefs of the security police, Stanislaw Mietkowski.

This defeat did not discourage the Stalinists. At a
conference of the Party's Warsaw Committee (on 26 June 1957) a
new assault on Gomulka's policies was undertaken by the former
chairman of the Committee of Public Security. Wladyslaw
Dworakowski. He attacked the decision of the Central Committee to
expel Berman and Radkiewicz. He said in effect that Radkiewics
had been made a scapegoat for other Party leaders who had been
responsible for the police terror. He named Cyrankiewicz,
Edward Ochab and Roman Zambrowski. Dworakowski was also reported
to have accused G-omulka of weakening the Polish-Soviet alliance
through the "introduction of capitalism in the countryside".

At the beginning of October 1957 it was disclosed in
Warsaw that a mimeographed pamphlet attacking Wladyslaw Gomulka
had been circulating through Communist ranks in Poland for two
months. The pamphlet called, by "Trybuna Ludu" of 13 November
1957"a characteristic encyclopedia of current Polish dogmatism"
consisted of 54 pages. It was signed by "Jan Kosa" (probably
a pseudonym) and charged that the first secretary was "leading
Poland back to capitalism" and destroying the Party's unity
and ideology. It attacked not only Gomulka's agricultural
policy and his "coexistence pact" with the Roman Catholic Church
but even the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. It called on "old Communists" to oppose the

[page 30]

present Party leaders. A security police investigation failed
to uncover the authorship of the pamphlet. That the pamphlet
produced some damage to Gomulka's authority within the Party
is evident from the fact that he felt necessary to refer to it
in hie speech at the 10th Plenum:

"Those who combat the Party from a hiding place,
secretly publishing or spreading slander, undermining
unity and paralyzing Party activity, have ceased to
be Communists, even though they might have a long
Party record. There can be no room in the Party for
such people..."

As time went on the influence of the Natolin group
decreased. Some were sent out abroad, as for instance Franciszek
Mazur and Kazimiers Witassewski appointed Polish ambassador and
military attache in Prague respectively, some were removed from
the CC (Wiktor Klosiewicz), some deprived of their positions of
voivodship secretaries (Stanislaw Pawlak in Warsaw, Feliks
Earanowski in Bydgosscz), some were removed from their ministerial
positions in the government (Stanislaw Lapot, Marian Minor,
Soleslaw Ruminski).

The position of the chief exponent of the Stalinist
faction Zenon Nowak was most enigmatic. Re-appointed Deputy
Prime Minister in October 1956, this leader of the Natolin group
mostly opposed to Gomulka's return to power, was reported to
have switched to Gomulka's side. Whatever the truth, there is
no evidence to the contrary, at any rate not in Nowak's public
statements.

Consolidation of Gomulka's Power

Because of the division of the Party into various
factions Gomulka had to postpone the date of the Third Party
Congress, first from 1957 to 1958 and then again to the 10 March
1959. Bmulka himself in a speech at the 10th Plenum of the
Party (on 24 October 1957) stated quite frankly:

"Preparation for the Congress cannot take place in an
atmosphere of discussion on dozens of doubts which
preoccupy various bourgeois and social-democratic
philosophers as to the possibility of building
socialism in Poland and in other countries, During the
pre-Congress discussion we can and should discuss the
forms of putting into practice the principles of
proletarian internationalism, but the discussion cannot be
conducted from the position of the absurd thesis on
the 'geographical situation of Poland'.

"The Congress of the Party is confronted with many
problems which await solution. In order to solve them
in a correct manner, the Congress should be a Congress
of a Party whose links are all capable of correctly
implementing its decisions. This leads to the following

[page 31]

conclusion: It is necessary to change the actuation in the
Party and to hold the Congress of the Party only in the
change d situation."

At the beginning of 1959 the situation has changed
considerably.

The Party has certainly strengthened its position and
its political power. It is far from having the iron grip of the
Stalinist era but it has also come a long way from the
post-October 1956 chaos. The major objectives outlined in the Politburo
letter of February 1957 have been achieved. This refers
particularly to so-called Party unity. "Revisionist, petty bourgeois,
nationalist or chauvinist" tendencies and trends have been driven
into the obscure corners of cafes. Polish revisionists are
disorganized and powerless; their influence is negligible. As one
wit recently remarked, Communism in Poland is a fiction, hence
one cannot expect much of a revisionist of a fiction. But, if the
revisionists' influence is negligible, their impact is evidently
still considerable; the Party in particular is aware of the
tremendous potential of revisionism and continues to consider
it as the main danger. In his closing speech at the 12th Plenum
of the Central Committee (15-18. October 1958) Gomulka himself
emphasized this and noted with satisfaction that his view was
shared by all the participants in the Plenum, The dogmatists,
or hardline Party activists, have been pacified by at least a
partial restitution of their privileges and power. Their
position, however, is still not undisputed, particularly at the local
level where power and influence are divided among the Party
secretary, the parish priest and possibly the local government (peasant)
representative, but the situation is much better for the Party man
than it was two years ago.

The "verification" (purge) neither rejuvenated nor
strengthened the Party in terms of militancy or ideological
fervor. The Party has merely ridden itself of corrupt and passive
elements although about 14 per cent of those purged were "removed"
for various offenses "against the policy of the Party" and 792
persons were expelled for the "spreading of views and for
conducting activities at variance with the Party line".

Of 1,266,754 members, 213,945 were dropped from Party
lists, thus leaving l,052,809 members on 31 March 1958 ("Tryhuna
Ludu" 25 May 1958) From 1 January to 31 August 1958 a total of
9,483 candidates were accepted, among them relatively few workers
and youth ("Trybuna Ludu" 30 September 1958).

The relatively small Influx of workers and youth into
its ranks continues to be a headache, as does the small
membership and lack of popularity of the Socialist Youth Union,
the Polish Komsomol (only 170,000 members, according to" Sztandar
Mlodych" 18-19 October 1958).

The alignment of forces within the Central Committee
has shifted in Gomulka's favor. The position of the Natolin

[page 32]

group within the CC reminds one of the position of revisionists
in the Party as a whole. With Zenon Noways reported desertion
to Gomulka's side the rallying to Gomulka' of Tadeusz Gede,
ambassador to Moscow (as evident from his speech during the
12th Plenum and the expulsion of Wiktor Klosiewics at the end
of February the group has remained powerless, with only Franciszek
Mazur waging his private war from Prague where he is Polish
ambassador. (He is said to make regular trips to Moscow stopping
in Warsaw to get in touch with his old allies.)

The most powerful group, that of Roman Zambrowski, with
a handful of Josef Cyrankiewica' s followers, have come very close
to Gomulka. They are reported to form an alliance of at least
50 out of just over 75 members of the Committee. The strength
of Gomulka's position was clearly reflected at the Central
Committee's 12th Plenum. The discussions at this Plenum do reveal
various shades of opinion but there was nothing like the direct
opposition to Party policy which has been apparent in the past.
Resolutions were unanimously approved and the Natolin no longer
in a position to attack openly, fell back on criticisms and
suggestions. Eugeniusz Szyr, Bole slaw Ruminski and Stanislaw Lapot
thought the planned rate of economic development too slow and
appealed for more "dynamism" (i.e. Stalinism). Buttinski and Lapot
also advocated more firmness in the "socialisation" of the
countryside, the latter urging the renewal of the "class struggle"
but both significantly admitted that rural socialization could
not be carried out overnight.

In the discussion on cultural matters at the Plenum
there was some criticism by Jersy Putrament Adam Schaff and
Leon Kruczkowski but it was of an ambivalent nature and cannot
clearly be construed as an attack on the Party line. All three
attacked by inference Minister of Education Wladyslaw Bienkowski
and the Minister of Higher Education, Stefan Zolkiewski, who is
also editor of "Nowa Kultura"; all three discussed the
alternatives of persuasion or coercion as an instrument of cultural
policy, but in the end the views of all three were ultimately
reflected in Gomulka's conclusion that it was wiser to play a
waiting game with the literary recalcitrants rather than declare
open war. The Katolin is, therefore, still there; its political
approach has not changed, so weak has it become, however, that
Gomulka could refer to its criticisms, almost contemptuously, as
a" small rivulet" flowing near the main stream of discussion, a
rivulet hardly worth charting on the present political map of
Poland.

Gomulka's g position in the nation, always his great
asset, is also still strong if only in a negative way. His
popularity has dropped tremendously, "but hardly anybody would wish
his replacement. He seems to have come to the Third Party
Congress in March full of confidence in his own power.

Within the Communist bloc he is no longer considered
a black sheep. With his Gdansk speech in June 1958 he came
sufficiently close to the Soviet line on the Nagy execution and the

[page 33]

Yugoslav heresy, the recent visits to the USSR produced a number
of declarations showing that he has formally returned to the
fold. This is probably the price he must pay for the peculiar
Polish detours on the common road to the Communist brand of
"socialism". Whatever his ways and means no enemy of his can
claim that he is not as firm a Communist as he has ever been.

[page 34]

Appendix I

THE PZPR BEFORE THE III CONGRESS (10.3.1959)

PZPR LOSSES AFTER 10 YEARS

Total Membership

On the day it was formed, on 15.12.1948, the Party
numbered 1,500,000 members and candidates. According to
official data during the period from 15-12.1948 to 31.12.1958 at
least 709,000 persons were admitted to the Party. This gives
a total number of 2,209,000. According to official data on
31.12.1958 the Party numbered 1,072,000 members. And thus losses
due to members leaving the Party, being crossed out of the list
of the Party, expulsion, verification and death amount to:

2,209,000 - 1,072,000 = 1,137,000

Workers

On 15.12.1948 there were 900,000 workers in the ranks of the
Party. On 1.9.58 - 381,000 workers (out of this number
only 261,000 employed directly in production). Loss - 519,000.
In reality it is greater, but the respective figure cannot be
closely established in view of the lack of exact statistical
data.

Peasants

On 15.12.1948 the Party had an its ranks 268,000 peasants.
Until 10.3.1954 52,400 peasants were admitted to the
Party. The figures of peasants admitted during the period
1O.3.1954 - 30.9.1958 are only fragmentary, but it is quite
certain that there were over 6,000 them. On 1.9.1958 there
were 125.000 peasants in the PSPR, which means that during the
period of 10 years the Party lost over 200,000 peasants.

Youth 

On 31.12.1955 the Party had 15.9 per cent Party
members (or candidates) up to the age of 25 but on 1 September 1958
the percentage dropped to 6.8 percent. The process of the
ageing of the Party also shows the percentage of members over 50
years of age. On 10.3.1954 there were 16.6 per cent of them,
and on 1.9.1958 - 20.6 per cent.

[page 35]

Remarks

Between the First and Second Congress, i.e. till 10.3.1954,
413,449 persons were admitted to the Party ("Nove Drogi" No. 3 of
1954). From September 1953 till December 1954, 217,331 persons
were admitted ("Nowe Drogi" No.6 of 1956); however 80,000
admitted before 10.3.1954 have to be deducted from the latter
figure ("Nowe Drogi" No.3 of 1954) as already added to the figure
of 413,339. Thus, the figure of 137,331 remains. In 1955,
123,843 were admitted ( "Nowe Drogi" No.6 of 1956). During the
three first quarters of 1957, more than 11,000 persons joined the
Party (calculation based on "Zycie Party" No.11 of 19 57). Between
September 1957 and September 1958, 12,334 persons were admitted
("Trybuna Ludu" of 28.12.1958). In the fourth quarter of 1958,
11,878 were admitted ("Trybuna Mazowiecka" of l.1.1959). There
are no figures available for 1956.

No exact figures concerning the number of admitted
workers are available. It is known from calculations that between
1.12.1949 and 1.12.1950 about 25,000 workers joined the Party
("Nowe Drogi" No.l of 1951), and during the first half of 1952 -
about 17,000 ("Nowe Drogi" No.8 of 1952). One can estimate that
the figure of 413,449, admitted to the Party until 10.3.1954,
contained at least 120,000 workers. In the period from September
1957 till September 1958, _4,000 workers were admitted to the Party
("Trybuna Ludu" of 28.12.1958). 

The official figures concerning the number of admitted
peasants are only fragmentary. Between April 1950 and 10.3.1954,
52,443 peasants were admitted ("Nowe Drogi" No. 3 of 1954). In
1955, in the Warsaw Voivodship, at least 1,100 peasants were
admitted (see "Nowe Drogi" No.6 of 1956). In the period between
September 1957 and September 1958, 3,270 peasants were admitted
to the Party ("Trybuna Ludu" of 28.12.1958).

[page 36]

Appendix II

THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE PZPR 
(figures 'below 1,000 have been left out)

15.XII.1948 	1,500,000	Zambrowaki's speech at the 1st Party
Congress, "Trybuna Ludu" of 21.XII.
1948.

1.III.1949	1,368,000	Bierut's speech at the Second Party
Congress, "Nowe Drogi" No.3 of 1954.

11-13.XI. 1949	1,360,000	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
1950	1,240,000	"	"	"	"	"	"	" 
1951	1,138,000	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
1952	1,146,000	"	"	"	"	"	"	" 
1953	1,226,000	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
28.II.1954	1,296,000	"	"	"	"	"	"	" 
31.XII.1955	1,343,000	"Nowe Drogi" No.6 of 19 56.
30,IT, 1951	1,23.1,000	"Zycie Warszawy" 25.X.1957.
30,IX.1958.	1,023,000	"Trybuna Ludu" 28.TIT. 1958
31,XII.1958	1,072,000	"Trybuna Masowiecka" 28.1.1959

[page 37]

Appendix III

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PZPR
(in absolute figures)

Date	Workers	Peasants	Agricultural workers	"White collar" employees	Others	Sources

15. XII.1948 (1st Congress)	900.000	268.000	-x)	260.000	-x)	Trybuna Ludu 21.12.48
l. v. 1949	781.000	197.436	56.809	311.772	21.274	Nowe Drogi No. 1.1951
xx) 10. III. 1954 (2nd Congress)	627.000	171.000	-x)	471.000	-x)	Worked out one the basis of Nowe Drogi No. 3 1954
31. XII. 1955	575.828	175.358	71.982	485.540	-x)	Nowe Drogi No. 6 1956
1. IX. 1958	xxx)381.324	125.015	45.914	431.178	40.146	Booklet by L. Krasucki: "On the Leading Role of the Party"

REMARKS: x) lack of data in official statistics
xx) approximate figures, worked out on the basis of B.Bierut's report at the 2nd PZPR Congress
xxx) out of this number there were 261,261,877 workers directly employed in the production

[page 38]

Appendix IV

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PZPR
(in percentages)

Date	Workers	Peasants	Agricultural workers	"White collar" employees	Others	Source

15.XII. 1948 1st Congress	60	18	-x)	17	5	Trybuna Ludu 21.12.1948
1.IV. 1949	57.1	14.4	4.2	22.8	1.5	Nowe Drogi No. 1 1951
XI.1949	51.9	14.3	4.9	26.1	2.8	Special issue of ND with report on Third Plenum
1.X. 1950	50.6	14.1	4.1	28.9	2.3	Nowe Drogi No.1 1951
10.III. 1954 2nd Congress	48.3 a)	13.2	-b)	36.4	2.1	Nowe Drogi No.6 1956
31. XII. 1955	42.8	13	5.4	36.1	2.7	Nowe Drogi No.6 1956
30. IX. 1957	39.9	12.8	4.8	33.8	9.3	Zycie Warszawy 25.10.57
30. IX. 1958	37.3	12.2	4.5	42.1	3.9	Ludwik Krasucki "On the Leading Role of the Party (January 1959)

REMAKS: x) data have not been published, agricultural workers have either been incorporated into "peasants"
or to "workers or partly to both of those columns
a)this column includes -- no doubt -- agricultural workers
b) data have not been published. Probably for reasons named under a)

[page 39]

Appendix V

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PZPR
(as at 1 September 1958)x)

There are workers in the Party including	31324	That is	37.3%
those directly employed in the production	261877	"	"	25.6%
Agricultural Workers	45,914	"	"	4.5%
Peasants	125,015	"	"	12.2%
"White Collar" employees including:	431,178	"	"	42.1%
engineers, architects, technicians, masters & miner foremen	75,734	"	"	7.4%
leading apparatus of the economic administration	41,338	"	"	7.4%
agronomists and agricultural "intelligentsia"	7,632	"	"	0.7%
scientific workers totally	3,842	"	"	0.4%
teachers	32,487	"	"	3.2%
health service employees	7,512	"	"	0.7%
artists, journalists, writers and other creative employees	3,183	"	"	0.3%
officials	161,331	"	"	15.8%
Others (handworkers, housewives, pensioneers).	40,146	"	"	3.9%

x) Ludwik Krasucki: "On the Leading Role of the Party" (January 1959)

[page 40]

Appendix VI

THE AGE OF PZPR MEMBERS IN PERCENTAGE

Date	Up to 25 years	Over 50 years	Source

10. III. 1954 2nd Congress	14.2	16.6	"Nowe Drogi" No. 3 1954

31.XII. 1955	15.9	17.4	"Nowe Drogi" No. 6 1956

1.IX. 1958	6.8	20.6	L. Krasucki: "On the Leading Role of the Party" (January 1959

[page 41]

Appendix VII

THE NUMBER OF BASIC PARTY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PZPR

Date	Number	Source

15. XII. 1948	46,700	"Trybuna Ludu" 21.XII. 1948

30.IX. 1958	51,418	"Trybuna Ludu" 28.XII.1958

[page 42]

Appendix VIII

NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF POLISH SOCIALIST PARTY -- PPS
(Before creation of PZPR)

Date	Strength	Source

August 1946	250,000	"Robotnik" 27.VIII.1946
March 1947 Nearly	700,000	"Robotnik" 24.III.1947
December 1947	750,000	"Robotnik" 17.XII.1947x)
December 1948	520,000	"Robotnik" 15.XII.1948xx)

x) including 130,000 peasants ("Robotnik" 9.VII.1947)
xx) the reduction of strength caused by "purges" before the merger with the PPR (Polish Workers Party)

[page 43]

Appendix IX

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF PPS (in percentages)

Date	Workers	Peasants	"White collar" employees	Others	Sources

30.VI.1947	60	16	14	10	"Robotnik" 21.X.1947

17.XII. 1947	60	15	-	-	"Robotnik" 17.XII. 1947

29.IX. 1948	57	10	23	10	"Przeglad Socjalistyczny" No. 9-12, 1948

[page 44]

Appendix X

NUMBERICAL STRENGTH OF THE POLISH WORKERS' PARTY -- PPR
(Before creation of PZPR)

Date	Strength	Sources

January 1945	30,000	Booklet of 1946 by R. Zambrowski: "For A Mass, Million-Member Party"
July 1945	160,000	"	"	"
October 1945	210,000	"	"	"
December 1945	235,000	"Nowe Drogi" No.1, 1954
December 1946	555,000	"	"	"	"
December 1947	820,000	"	"	"	"
December 1948	1,006,000	"	"	"	"

[page 45]

Appendix XI

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF PPR (in percentages)

Date Workers	Agricultural workers	Peasants	"White collar" employees	Others	Source

1945 62.2	-	28.2	9.6	-	"Nowe Drogi"

15.XII. 48 53.6	5.2	21.3	17.6	2.3	" "

[page 46]

Appendix XII

NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND -- KPP

Date	Strength	Source

1924	5,000 members	According to Piatnicki's report at the 5th Comintern Congress
July 1930	3,300 "	"Polityka" 29.XI.1958
March 1931	4,500 "	"	"
Oct. 1931	6,800 "	"	"
March 1932	8,000 "	"	"
March 1933	9,200 "	"	"
1935	10,300 "	"Polityka" 20-27.XII. 1958

[page 47]

Appendix XIII

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE KPP IN 1933 [*]
(in percentages)

Factory workers	17%

Workers of the small industry and others	31%

Unemployed	18%

Agricultural workers	4%

Peasants	30%

* Taken from "Polityka" 29 November 1958

[page 48]

Appendix XIV

THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE KPP IN 1933 *
(in percentages)

Poles	71%

Jews	26%

Ukrainians	3%

* Taken from "Polityka" 29 November 1958

[page 49]

Appendix XV

THE LEADERS OF THE POLISH COMMUNISTS AND THEIR FATE

Name of the Party	Name of the leaders	What happened to them

Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKP iL)	Luxemburg Rosa	Murdered by German officiers in Berlin on 15 January 1919

Polish Socialist Party - Left (PPS-Lewica)	Sochacki-Czeszejko Jerzy	Liquidated in Moscow in 1933

Communist Workers Party of Poland (KPRP)	Warski-Warszawski Adolf Kostrzewa Wera (Koszutska Maria) Walexki-Horwitz Maksymilian	Liquidated in the years 1937-1938 in Soviet Union

Communist Party of Poland (KPP)	Leszcynski-Lenski Julian Pruchniak-Sewer Edward Ryng-Heryng Jerzy	Liquidated in Soviet Union in 1937-1938

Polish Workers Party (PPR)	Nowotko Marceli	Shot by a Communist Molojec for alleged collaboration with the Gestapo in November 1942

	Finder Pawel	Arrested by the Gestapo in November 1943 and later executed

	Gomulka Wladyslaw	Removed from the leadership on 3 September 1948 and later arrested

Polish United Workers Party (PZPR)	Bierut Boleslaw	Died in Moscow in March 1956

	Ochab Edward	Resigned in OCtober 1956
	Gomulka Wladyslaw	The present leader

[page 50]

Appendix XVI

MEMBERSHIP OF THE POLITBURO (1945-1959)

1945 Polish Workers Party	1948 Polish Workers Party	1948 United Workers Party	1950 United Workers Party	1952 United Workers Party

Gomulka Wladyslaw	-	-	-	-
Berman Jakub	Berman Jakub	Berman Jakub	Berman Jakub	Berman Jakub
Minc Hilary	Minc Hilary	Minc Hilary	Minc Hilary	Minc Hilary
Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman
Spychalski Mardian	Spychalski Marian	Spychalski Marian	-	-
Bore jsza Jerzy	-	-	-	-
Modzelewski Zygmunt	-	-	-	-
	Bierut Boleslaw	Bierut Boleslaw	Bierut Boleslaw	Bierut Boleslaw
	Jozwiak Franciszek	jozwiak Franciszek	Joswiak Franciszek	Jozwiak Franciszek
	Zawadzki Aleksander	Zawadzki Aleksander	Zawadzki Aleksander	Zawadzki Aleksander
Radkiewicz Stanislaw	Radkiewicz Stanislaw	Radkiewicz Stanislaw	Radkiewicz Stanislaw
	Mazur Franciszek	Mazur Franciszek(1)	Masur Francissek	Mazur Franciszek
	Ochab Edward(1)	Ochab Edward(1)	Ochab Edward(1)	Ochab Edward
Chelchowsi Hilary (1)	Chelchowski Hilary(1)	Chelchowaki Hilary(1)	Chelchowski Hilary(1)
		Cyrankiewicz Jozef	Cyrenkiewicz Jozef	Cyrankiewicz Jozef
		Swiatkowski Henryk	-	-
Rapacki Adam	Repacki Adam	Rapacki Adam
			Rokossowski Konstanty	Rokossowski Konstan
			Nowak Zonon(1)	Nowak Zenon
		Matuszewski Stofan(1)	Matuszewski Stefan(1)	Dworakowski Wladyslaw(1)

(1) candidate-member
[page 51]

Membership of the Politburo (1945-1959) - continued

1953	1954	July 1956	October 1956

Bierut Boleslaw	Bierut Boleslaw	-	-
Berman Jakub	Berman Jakub	-	-
Cyrankiewicz Jozef	Cyrankiewicz Jozef	Cyrankiewicz Jozef	Cyramkiewicz Jozef
Jozwiak Franciszek	Jozwiak Franciszek	Jozwiak Franciszek	-
Mazur Franciszek	Mazur Franciszek	Mazur Franciszek	-
Minc Hilary	Minc Hilary	Minc Hilary	-
Ochab Edward	Ochab Edward	Ochab Edward	Ochab Edward
Nowak Zenon	Nowak Zenon	Nowak Zenon	-
Radkiewicz Stanislaw	Radkiewicz Stanislaw	-	-
Rapacki Adam	Rapacki Adam(1)	Rapacki Adam	Rapacki Adam
Rokossowski Konstanty	Rokossowski Konstanty	Rokossowski Konstanty	-
Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman
Zawadzki Aleksander	Zawadzki Aleksander	Zawadzki Aleksander	Zawadzki Aleksander
Matuszewski Stefan (1)	-	-	-
Dworakowaki Wladyslaw (1)	Dworakowski Wladyslaw	Dworakowaki Wladyslaw	-
chelchowski Hilary (1)	Chelchowski Hilary (1)	Chelchowski Hilary	-
		Gierek Edward	-
		Nowak Roman	-
		Jedrychowski Stefan (1)	Jedrychowski Stefan
		Stawinski Eugeniusz (1)	Loga-Sowinski Ignacy
				Morawski Jerzy
				Gomulka Wladyslaw

(1) candidate-member

[page 52]

Appendix XVII

THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE PARTY SECRETARIAT (1948-1959)

1948	1950	1953	1954

Bierut Boleslaw	Bierut Boleslaw	Bierut Boleslaw	Bierut Boleslaw
Berman Jakub	-	-	-
Cyrankiewicz Jozef	Cyrankiewicz Jozef	-	-
Minc Hilary	-	-	-
Swiatkowski Henryk	-	-	-
Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman	-
Zawadzki Aleksanier	Zawadzki Aleksander	Zawadzki Aleksander	-
	Ochab Edward	Ochab Edward	Ochab Edward
	Nowak Zenon	Nowak Zenon	-
	Mazur Franciszek	Masur Franciszek	Mazur Franciszek
			Dworakowski Wladyslaw	Dworakowski Wladyslaw
			Pszczolkowski Edmund	-

[page 53]

The Membership of the Party Secretariat (1948-1959) - continued

July 1956	October 1956	May 1957

Ochab Edward	Ochab Edward	-
Mazur Franciszek	-	-
Matwin Wladyslaw	Matwin Wladyslaw	Matin Wladyslaw
Morawski Jerzy	-	Morawski Jerzy
Albrecht Jerzy	Albrecht Jerzy	Albrecht Jerzy
Gierek Edward	Gierek Edward	Gierek Edward
Jarosinski Witold	Jarosinaki Witold	Jarosinski Wittold
		Zambrowski Roman	Zambrowski Roman
		Gomulka Wladyslaw	Gomulka Wladyslaw
			Kliszko Zenon

[page 54]

Appendix XVIII

MEMBERSHIP OF THE PZPR CENTRAL COMMITTEE (1948-1959)

The first Central Committee of the Polish Communist
Party (the PPR) was probably elected or nomnated in 1942, but
the ful list of the members was never published. From various
Party publications the following names can be established:

Nowotko Marceli
Finder Pawel
Fornalska Malgorzata
Wieczorek Jozef
Malinowski Franciszek
Kowalczyk Anastazy
Krasicki Janek
Gomulka Wladyslaw
Bierut Boleslaw
Chelchowski Hilary
Jozwiak Franciszek

Our tables show all the members of the Central Committee
from 1948 when the present Party, the Polish United Workers Party
was born, to the current Central Committee at the Third Congress
of the Party.

[page 55]

The membership of the Central Committee (1948-1959) - continued

1948 The first (unity) Congress	1953	1954 The Second Congress	1959 On the eve of the Third Congress

Albrecht Jerzy	Albrecht Jerzy	Albrecht Jerzy	Albrecht Jerzy
Alster Antoni	Alster Antoni	Alster Antoni	Alster Antoni
Arski Stefan	Arski Stefan	Baranowski Feliks	Baranowski Feliks
Baranowski Feliks	Baranowski Feliks	Berman Jakub (3)	Blinowski Franciszek
Berman Jakub	Berman Jakub	Bierut Boleslaw (4)	Borizilowski Hilary
Burski Alexksander	Burski Alekaander	Bordzilowski Jerzy	Cyrankiewicz Jozef
Chelchowski Hilary	Chelchowski Hilary	Chelchowski Hilary	Daniszewski Tadeusz
Cwik Tadeusz	Cwik Tadeusz	Cyrankiewicz Jozef	Dabrowski Konstanty
Cyrankiewicz Jozef	Cyrankiewicz Jozef	Daniszewski Tadeusz	Dietrich Tadeusz
Daniszewski Tadeusz	Daiszewski Tadeusz	Dabrowski Konstanty	Dluski Ostap
Dabrowski Konstanty	Dabrowski Konstanty	Dietrich Tadeusz	Dolsnski Adam
Dietrich Tadeusz	Dietrich Tadeusz	Dluski Ostap	Dworakowaki Wladyslaw
Dluski Cstap	Dluski Ostap	Dolinski Adam	Gajaler Roman
Duniak Stanislaw	Dunkak Stanislaw	Dworakowski Wlaiyslaw	Gede Tadeusz
Dolinski Adam	Dolinski Adam	Wiedler Franciszek (5)	Gierek Edward
Dworakowski Wladyslaw	Dworakowski Wladyslaw	Gajzler Roman	Gomulka Wladyslaw (6)
Fiedler Franciszek	Fiedler Franciszek	Gede Tadeusz	Hoffman Mieczyslaw
Gomulka Wladyslaw 1)	Gede Tadeuaz 2)	Gierek Edward	Izydorczyk Jan

1) Removed Nov. 1949
2) Nominated March 1953
3) Removed after Minth Plenum 
4) Died March 1956 
5) Died November 1956
6) Nominated to CE on 19 Oct. 1956

[page 56]

The Membership of the Central Committe (1948-1959) - continued

1948 The First (unity) Congress	1953	1954 The Second Congress	1959 On the eve of the Third Congress

Hoffman Mieczyslaw	Hoffman Mieczyslaw	Hoffman Mieczyslaw	Jablonski Henryk
Izydorczyk Jan	Izydorczyk Jan	Izydorczyk Jan	Jarosinski Witold
Jablonski Henryk	Jablonski Henryk	Jablonsky Henryk	Jaroszewicz Piotr
Jaroszewicz Piotr	Jaroszewicz Piotr	Jarosinski Witold	Jaworska Helena 4)
Jedrychowsk Stefan	Jedrychowski Stefan	Jaroszewicz Piotr	Jedrychowski Stefan
Jozwiak Franciszek	Jozwiak Franciszek	Jedrychowski Stefan	Jozwiak Franciszek
Jozwiak Franciszek	Jozwiak Franciszek	Jedrychowski Stefan	Jozwiak Franciszek
Kasman Leon	Kasman Leon	Jozwiak Franciszek	Kalinowski Steran
Kluszynska Dorota	Kluszynska Dorota	Falinowski Stefan	Kasman Leon
Kole Julian	Kole Julian	Easman Leon	Kliszko Zenon 5)
Kozlowska Helena	Kozlowska Helena	Elosiewicz Wiktor 2)	Kole Julian
Korczyc Wladyslaw	Korczyc Wladyslaw	Eole Julian	Kowarz Jan
Kurylowicz Adams	Kurylowicz Adam	Eozlowska Helena	Kruczek Wladyslaw
Lange Oskar	Lange Oskar	Kruczek Wladyslaw	Kuligowski Antoni
Lewikowski Waclaw	Lewikowski Waclaw	Kuligowski Antoni	Lange Oskar
Machno Jozef	Machno Jozef	Lange Oskar	Lewikowski Waclaw
Matwin Wladyslaw	Matwin Wladyslaw	Lewikowski Waclaw	Loge-Sowinsky Ignacy 6)
Matuszewski Stefan	Matuszwski Stefan	Lapot Stanieslaw	Lapot Stanisalw
Mazur Franciszek	Mazur Franciszek	Machno Jozef	Machno Jozef
Mietkowski Mieczyslaw	Mietkowski Mieczyslaw	Matwin Wladyslaw	Matwin Wldyslaw
Mijal Kazmierz	Mijal Kazimierz	Mazur Franciszek	Mazur Franciszek
Minc Hilary	Mino Hilary	Mietkowski Mieczyslaw 3)	Mijal Kazimierz
Modzelewski Zygmunt	Modzelewski Zygmunt	Mijal Kazimierz	Minc Hilary
Motyka Lucjan	Motyka Lucjan	Minc Hilary	Misiaszek Stefan
Nowak Zenon	Naszkowski Marian 1)	Misiaszek Stefan	Moczar Mieczyslaw 7)

1) Nominated July 1950
2) 2)Removed 1 March 1958	
3) Removed after Eight Plenum
4) Nominated 28 July 1956
5) Nominated 19 Oct. 1956
6) Nominated 19 Oct. 1956
7) Nominated 28 July 1956

[page 57]

The membership of the Central Committe (1948-1959) - continued

1948 The First (unity) Congress	1953	1954 The Second Congress	1959 On the eve of the Third Congress

Ochab Edward	Nowak Zenon	Modzelewsk Zygmunt 5)	Morawski Jerzy
Oks Mateusz	Ochab Edward	Morawski Jerzy	Motyka Lucjan
Pasenkiewicz Kazimierz	Oks Mateusz	Motyka Lucjan	Naszkowski Marian
Popiel Mieozyslaw	Pasenkiewicz Kazimierz	Naszkowski Marian	Nowak Roman
Pragierowa Eugenia	Popiel Mieczyslaw	Nowak Roman	Nowak Zenon
Radkiewicz Stanislaw	Poplawski Stanislaw 2)	Nowak Zenon	Ochab Edward
Rapacki Adam	Pragierowa Eugenia	Ochab Edward Oks Mateusz
Reczek Wlodzimierz	Pszcolkowski Edmund 3)	Oks Mateusz	Olszewski Jozef
Romkowski Roman	Radkiewicz Stanislaw	Olszewski Jozef	Pawlak Stanislaw
Rusinek Kazimierz	Rapacki Adam	Pawlak Stanislaw	Pezczolkowski Edmund
Rybicki Marian	Reczek Wlodzimierz	Poplawski Stanislaw 6)	Rapacki Adam
Skowronski Ignacy	Rokossowski Konstanty 4)	Pszczolkowski Edmund	Reczek Wlodzimierz
Skrzeszewski Stanislaw	Romkowski Roman	Radkiewicz Stanislaw 7)	Ruminski Boleslaw 11)
Spychalski Marian 1)	Rusinek Kazimierz	Rapacki Adam	Rybicki Marian
Swiatkowski Henryk	Rybicki Marian	Teczek Wlodzimierz	Skrzeszewski Stanislaw
Swietlik Konrad	Skowronski Ignacy	Rokossowski Konstanty 8)	Spychalski Marian 12)
Strzeleck Ryszard	Skrzeszewski Stanislaw	Romkowski Roman 9)	Stawinski Eugeniusz 13)
Szozesniak Jozef	Swiatkowski Henryk	Rybicki Marian	Strzelecki Ryszard
Szymanowaki Zygmunt	Strzelecki Ryszard	Strzelecki Ryszard	Szyr Eugeniusz
Szyr Eugeniusz	Szczesniak Jozef	Sztachelski Jerzy	Swietlik Konrad
Wierblowski Stefan	Sztachelski Jerzy Szynanowski Zygmunt 10)	Tatarkowna Michaline 14)
Witaszewski Kazimierz	Szymanowski Zygmunt	Szyr Eugeniusz	Titkow Walenty
Wolski Wladyslaw		Swietlik Konrad	Tokaraki Julian
Zambrowski Roman		Titkow Walenty

1) Removed and arrested in 1950
2)According to "Trybuna Ludu"	 29.1.1952	
3)Nominated in March 1953
4) Nominated in November 1949
5) Died April 1954
6) Sent back to USSR
7) Removed after 9th Plenum
8) Sent back to USSR Octber 1956
9) Removed January 1955, arrested April 1956
10) Died Mary 1956
11) Nominated 28 July 1956
12) Nominated to CC on 19 October 1956
13) Nominated 28 July 1956
14) Nominated 28 July 1956

[page 58]

The Membership of the Central Committee (1948-1959) - continued

1948 The First (unity Congress	1953	1954 The Second Congress	1959 On the eve of the Third Congress

Zarzycki Janusz	Szyr Eugeniusz	Tokarski Julian	Wasilkowska Zofja
Zawadzki Aleksander	Wierblowski Stefan	Wasilkowska Zofia	Werblan Andrzej 1)
Zawadzki Stanislaw	Witaszewski Kazimierz	Wierblowski Stefan	Witaszewski Kazimierz
	Wolski Wladyslaw	Witaszewaki Kazimierz	Wierblowski Stefan
	Zambrowski Roman	Wojas Pawl	Wojas Pawel
	Zarzycki Janusz	Zambrowski Roman	Zamdzki Aleksaander
	Zawdzki Stanislaw	Zolkiewski Stefan	Zolkiewski Stefan

1) Nominated 28 July 1956

[page 59]

The Candidate Members of the Central Committee (1948-1959) - continued

1948 The First (unity) Congress	1953	1954 The Second Congress	1959 Third Congress

Blinowski Franciszek	Blinowski Franciszek	Bendek Boleslaw	Bendek Boleslaw
Bodalski Mieczyslaw	Bodalski Miecyslaw	Bodalski Mieczyslaw	Bodalski Mieczyslaw
Borejsza Jerzy	Borejsza Jerzy	Brodzinski Stanislaw	Brodzinski Stanislaw
Ciepielowa Helena	Ciepielowa Helena	Bydzynska Celina	Budzynska Celina
Dabek Stefan	Dabek Stefan	Domagala Czeslaw	Domagala Dzeslaw
Elozewski Maciej	Elczewski Maciej	Dominski Jerzy	Dominski Jerzy
Finkelsztajn Leon	Finkelsztajn Leon	Finkielsztajn Julian	Finkielsztejn Julian
Geizler Roman	Geizler Roman	Granas Romana	Granas Romana
Hetmanska Wiktoria	Granas Romana 2)	Jablonski Jan	Jablonski Jan
Hochfeld Jlian	Hetmanska Wiktoria	Jagielski Mieczyslaw	Jagielski Mieczyslaw
Jaszczuk Borys	Hochfeld Julian	Jaszczuk Boleslaw	Jaszczuk Boleslaw
Kaczmarski Wilhelm	Jarosinski Witold 3)	Jaworska Helena 6)	Kaczmarski Wilhelm
Kalinowski Jozef	Jaszczuk Borys	Kaczmarski Wilhelm	Kalinowaki Jozef
Kaminski Antoni	Kaczmarski Wilhelm	Kalinowski Jozef	Klecha Jan
Kliszko Zenon 1)	Kalinowski Jozef	Klecha Jan	Kownlski Boleslaw
Klosiewicz Wiktor	Kaminski Antoni	Kowalski Boleslaw	Krajewski Michal
Kowalczewski Marian	Klosiewicz Wiktor	Krajewski Michal	Kruczkowski Leon
Kozlowski Jan	Kowalxzewski Marian	Kruczkowski Leon	Kuleszynska Wanda 8)
Krajewski Jakub	Kozlowski Jan	Lewinska Pelagia	Lewinska Pelagia
Kubecki Ignacy	Krajewski Jakub	Lorek Feliks	Lorek Feliks
Kuligowski Ryszard	Krajewski Michal 4)	Laszewicz Arkadiusz	Laszewicz Arkadiusz
Kurylowicz Boleslaw	Kruczek Wladyslaw 5)	Minor Marian	Minor Marian
Lech Jan	Kubecki Ignacy	Moczar Mieczyslaw 7)	Musialowa Aljoja
Loga-Sowinski Ignacy	Kuligowski Ryszard	Musialowa alicja	Nagcrzanski Jozef

1) Removed November 1949
2) Nominated November 1949
3) Nominated November 1949
4) Nominated November 1949
5) Nominated March 1953
6) Nominated in CC 28 July 1956
7) Nominated in CC 28 July 1956
8) Nominated Sept. 1955

[page 60]

The Candidate Members of the Central Committee (1948-1959) - continued

1948 The First (unity) Congress	1953	1954 The Second Congress	1959 On the eve of the Third Congress

Lapot Stanislaw	Kurylowicz Boleslaw	Nagorzanski Jozef	Nieszporek Ryszard
Metera Piotr	Lech Jan	Nieszpcrek Ryszard	Pilawka Stanislaw
Minor Marian	Loga-Sowinksi Ignacy	Pilawka Stanislaw	Piwowarska Irena
Moczar Mieczyslaw	Lapot Stanislaw	Piwowarska Irena	Popiel Mieczyslaw
Morawski Jerzy	Metera Piotr	Popiel Mieczyslaw	Pryma Jerzy
Nieszporek Ryszard	Minor Marian	Pryma Jerzy	Ptasinski Jan
Nowak Roman	Moczar Mieczyslaw	Ptasinski Jan	Putrament Jerzy
Clszewaki Jozef	Morawski Jerzy	Putrament Jerzy Schaff Adam
Orlowska Edwards	Nieszporek Ryszard	Ruminaski Boleslaw 1)	Sendek Jan
Petruczynik Feliks	Nowak Roman	Schaff Adam	Sokorski Wlodzimierz
Pietrzyk Mieczyslaw	Olszewaki Jozef	Sendek Jan	Starewicz Artur
Piwowarska Irena	Orlowska Edwarda	Skowronski Ignacy	Staszewski Stefan
Pszczolkowaki Edmund	Petruczynik Feliks	Sokorski Wlodzimierz	Tepicht Jerzy
Putrament Jerzy	Pietrzyk Mieczyslaw	Starewicz Artur	Tkaczow Stanislaw
Ruminski Boleslaw	Piwowarska Irena	Staszewski Stefan	Trusz Jan
Salcewicz Jozef	Pszczolkowski Edmund	Stawinski Eugeniusz 2)	Wachowicz Franciszek
Sokorski Wlodzimierz	Putrament Jerzy	Szymanski Stanislaw 3)	Wagrowski Mieczyslaw
Szymanski Stanislaw	Rumanski Boleslaw	Tatarkowna	Michalina 4)	Wagrowski Mieczyslaw

1) Nominated to CC 28 July 1956
2) Nominated to CC 28 July 1956
3) Died October 1956
4) Nominated to CC 28 July 1956

[page 61]

The Candidate Members of the Central Committe (1948-1959) - continued

1948 The First (unity) Congress	1953	1954 The Second Congress	1959 On the eve of the Third Congress

Tepicht Jerzy	Salcewicz Jozef	Tepicht Jerzy	Wrfel Roman
Tkaczow Stanislaw	Sokorski Wlodzimierz	Tkaczow Stanislaw	Wysokinski Stanislaw
Tokarski Julian	Stawinski Eugeniusz 1)	Trusz Jan
Wasilkowska Zofia	Staszewski Stefan 2)	Wachowicz Franciszek
Wagrowski Mieczyslaw	Szymanski Stanislaw	Wagrowski Mieczyslaw
Werblan Andrzej	Tepicht Jerzy	Werblan Andrzej 5)
Werfel Roman	Tkaczow Stanislaw	Wagrowski Mieczyslaw
Werblan Andrzej	Tepicht Jerzy	Werblan Andrzej 5)
Werfel Roman	Tkaczow Stanislaw	Werfel Roman
Wojas Pawel	Titkow Walenty 3)	Wysokinski Starislaw
Wudzki Leon	Tokarski Julian
Wysokinski Stanislaw	Wagrowski Mieczyslaw
Zolkiewski Stefan	Wasilkowska Zofia
	Werblan Andrzej
	Werfel Roman
	Wojas Pawel
	Wudzki Leon
	Wysckinski Stanislaw
	Zolkiewski Stefan

1) Nominated April 1949
2) Nominated April 1949
3) Nominated March 1953
4) Nominated March 1953
5) Nominated to CC July 1956

[page 62]

Appendix XIX

MEMBERSHIP OF THE AUDIT COMMISSION OF THE PARTY

1948 The First Congress	1954 The Second Congress

Balicki Zygmunt	Arski Stefan
Bielski Roman	Balicki Zygmunt
Fotek Antoni	Bakowski Karol
Leczycki Franciszek	Bielski Leon
Rozga Stefan	Czerwinski Marian
Stawinski Eugeniusz	Elczewski Maciej
Szafranski Nehryk	Goralski Wladyslaw
Szwalbe	Kowalczyk Stanislaw
Tureniec Mieczyslaw	Leczycki Franciszek
Wojciechowski Grzegorz	Marzec Mieczyslaw
Zaruk-Michalski ALedksander	Matuszewski Stefan
	Orlowska Edwarda
	Pragierowa Eugenia
	Rozga Waclaw
	Rygliszyn Jozef
	Stachacz Stanislaw
	Stasiak Leon
	Wicha Wladyslaw
	Wojciechowski Grzegorz
	Zarzycki Janusz
	Zieleniec Leon
	Zaruk-Michalski Aledksander

[page 63]

Appendix XX

MEMBERSHIP OF THE CENTRAL PARTY CONTROL COMISSION

1948 The First Congress	1954 The Second Congress

Brystygier Julja	Adalinska Halina
Czerwinski Marian	Cabo Wojciech
Dechnik Jozef	Czerwinski Marian
Domagala Czeslaw	Dolinski Adam
Feder Teodora	Gajzler Roman
Geizler Roman	Jankowska Ludwika
Heller Rudolf	Jozwiak Franciszek 1)
Jankowska Ludwika	Kalinowski Stefan
Kalinowski Stefan	Kedzierski Jan 2)
Kaminska Maria	Kowalczyk Jozef
Kembrowski Eugeniusz	Kozlowska Janian 3)
Kedzierski Jan	Kromer Tadeusz
Komar Waclaw	Krupinski Tadeusz
Kowalczyk Jozef	Kubica Walenty
Lewikowski Waclaw	Malecka Maria 4)
Lewinska Pelagia	Misiaszek Stefan
Malecka Maria	Mortasowa Wladyslawa
Marczewski Stanislaw	Nowak Roman 6)
Misiaszek Stefan	Ochal Aleksander
Nowicka Malgorzata Paterowa Zofia
Pasenkiewicz Kazimierz	Polturzycki Bronislaw
Paterowa Zofia	Pilawka Stanislaw
Petruczynik Feliks	Rowinski Waclaw 7)
Pieczynska Maria	Rutkowski Szymon
Rowinski Waclaw	Skrzypkowski Waclaw
Rutkowski Jan	Sobkowicz Kazimierz
Staskiak Leon	Starzec Adolf
	Walczyk Stanislaw
	Witaszewski Kanislaw
	Witaszewski Kazimierz
	Wudzki Leon
	Zachariasz Szymon

1) Charirman: dismissed from post 28 July 1956
2) Died February 1958
3) Coopted 28 July 1956
4) Died November 1953
5) Coopted 28 July 1956
6) Coopted and appointed chairman 28 July 1956
7) Died February 1956

[page 64]

Membership of the Party Central Control Commission - continued

1948 The First Congress	1954 The Second Congress

Swietlik Konrad	Zebrun Olga
Sztachelski Jerzy	Zubowicz Wladyslaw
Szydlowski Jozef
Tomorowicz Janusz
Treblinska Magdalena
Wudzki Leon
Zachariasz Szymon

End

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